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United States P. Ross: Search and Seizure
Made Simple
The United States Supreme Court in United States v. Ross vastly simpli-
fied the process of searching closed containers found in an automobile dur-
ing a lawful Carroll search yet, at the same time, placed in question the
importance of the search warrant in the scheme offourth amendment juris-
prudence by equating the policeman's determination of probable cause
with that of the magistrate.
I. INTRODUCTION
After a streak of bad luck, things finally seemed to be going Al-
bert's way.' When the police arrested him for selling heroin from
the trunk of his car, Albert's lawyer could not keep the United
States Attorney from introducing as evidence the heroin found at
the time of his arrest. As a result, a District of Columbia jury con-
victed Albert of possession of heroin with the intent to distribute
the drug.2 But after Albert had cooled his heels in jail for some
time, two things happened which convinced him his luck had
changed: the United States Supreme Court decided Robbins v.
California, 3 and the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit reversed his conviction.4
Albert's lawyer was able to convince the court of appeals that
the police should not have searched a paper bag found in the
trunk of Albert's car5 without a warrant. That left the United
States with no evidence and no case against Albert. The United
States appealed the decision and the Supreme Court agreed to
hear the case.6 But that did not worry Albert; after all, had not
the Supreme Court decided Robbins not more than a year ago?
1. A certain amount of license-as to what the participants thought and
said-has been taken in the relation of the events leading up to the published de-
cision of this case. This reflects an interpretation of the events by the author in an
attempt to make the note more readable.
2. United States v. Ross, No. 78-698 (D.C. Criminal 1978).
3. 453 U.S. 420 (1981). See infra notes 75-98 and accompanying text.
4. United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (en banc). The first
opinion of the three-judge panel of the court of appeals is unreported.
5. Albert had placed the heroin in the trunk of his car.
6. United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 454 U.S. 891
(1981). Albert was allowed to proceed in forma pauperis before the Supreme
Court.
In Robbins, the Supreme Court told the State of California its
highway patrolmen should not have opened two packages
wrapped in opaque plastic, 7 found in the depressed luggage com-
partment of Robbins' car, without a search warrant. The facts in
Albert's case were nearly identical. It seemed unlikely the Court
would distinguish the search of Albert's trunk with that of Rob-
bins' luggage compartment. It was even less likely that the Court
would reverse the Robbins decision, not much more than a year
old, knowing the confusion and uproar it would cause in the legal
community. Surely the Court took the case, at least in Albert's
mind, to re-express its support for the principle of law stated in
Robbins.
Albert's celebration proved premature, however. The Supreme
Court dashed his hopes,8 reversing the appellate court, overruling
Robbins v. California, eliminating some of the language in Arkan-
sas v. Sanders, 9 and declaring a general rule that police may, with
probable cause to stop and search an automobile, open any
container found therein without a warrant.10 That the Court's de-
cision came as a surprise to those involved in Ross goes without
saying. Those in the legal community who thought they per-
ceived a trend in the troubled area of search and seizure were
shocked.
Easily missed in all the excitement and confusion, however, is
something of greater long-range significance. Underlying the sur-
face of Ross appears the unexpressed opinion that the warrant re-
quirement of the fourth amendment 1 has outlived its usefulness,
is archaic and unnecessary, and imposes a burden on law enforce-
ment completely out of- proportion to any benefit it gives to the
public.
Although the Court does not air this issue openly, it is implicit
in the decision. Perhaps the Court felt the time was not ripe for
such grave criticism, or perhaps it felt this debate was best left to
the legislature. Regardless of its motive, if it is true that a major-
7. Robbins had hidden marijauna in the packages.
8. United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982).
9. 442 U.S. 753 (1979). The case was relied upon by both the court of appeals
in Ross, and the Supreme Court in Robbins.
10. 102 S. Ct. at 2172. "If probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully
stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents
that may conceal the object of the search." Id.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vio-
lated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.
Id. See infra note 143 and accompanying text.
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ity of the justices of the nation's highest court has lost respect for
the warrant requirement, the Court works a disservice on the
public by not voicing its belief. Since this question is potentially
the most important aspect of United States v. Ross, it will be the
focus of this note.
II. FACTS OF THE CASE
There was never any serious doubt that Detective Marcum had
probable cause to search Albert's car. On a cold November eve-
ning in 1978, an anonymous informant, who had proved reliable in
the past, phoned Marcum at police headquarters and told him
"Bandit" was selling heroin from the trunk of a "purplish ma-
roon" Chevrolet Malibu with District of Columbia license plates.
The informant gave Marcum a detailed physical description of
Bandit and related how he had just witnessed him complete a
sale of heroin. Bandit told the informant he had more heroin in
the trunk of his car.
Detective Marcum, accompanied by Detective Cassidy and Ser-
geant Gonzales, immediately drove out to the street address given
him by the informant. There they found a parked automobile
fitting the description given by the informant. Marcum checked
the car's license plates and found they were registered in the
name of Albert Ross. A computer check on Ross revealed a phys-
ical description identical to the one given by the infolmant. It
also disclosed that Ross used the alias "Bandit." The officers
drove past the car and through the area to avoid alerting the
driver to their presence.
They returned in five minutes and observed the Malibu turning
off of the street it had been parked on. They pulled alongside to
get a look at the driver and found he fit the specific description of
Bandit given by the informant. The officers then stopped the car
and instructed its driver to get out. While the detectives searched
the driver, Sergeant Gonzales saw a bullet on the front seat of the
car. An interior search turned up a pistol in the glove compart-
ment. The officers arrested Albert and handcuffed him. Detective
Cassidy took Albert's keys and opened the trunk of the car, find-
ing a closed "lunch-type" paper bag. Cassidy opened the bag and
found inside a number of clear plastic bags containing white pow-
der. He closed the bag, replaced it in the trunk, and drove the car
to headquarters.
At headquarters, Cassidy made a thorough search of the car
and trunk finding, in addition to the previously mentioned paper
bag, a zippered leather pouch. Cassidy unzipped the pouch and
found $3,200 in cash. The police laboratory confirmed what the of-
ficers already suspected: the powder in the plastic bags was her-
oin. Albert was charged with possession of heroin with intent to
distribute. 12 At no time did the officers obtain a search warrant.
The trial court readily disposed of Albert's contention that the
search of the bag and pouch were illegal.13 The court ruled that
the search of Albert's car was proper because the police, having
received information from an informant who had proved reliable
in the past and personally verifying the information once they
found Albert's car, had probable cause to make the search. The
trial court also found the search of the bag and pouch to have
been well within the boundaries of a proper automobile search.
The court of appeals, however, was not so easily convinced.
The three-member panel of the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit was troubled by the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Arkansas v. Sanders. 14 Compelled by Sanders to consider
the search of the bag and pouch separate from the search of the
car,15 the court of appeals inquired whether Albert had such a
reasonable expectation of privacy16 in the bag and pouch as to
make the police officer's search of such items illegal without a
warrant. The court of appeals concluded that the search of the
pouch was illegal but that the search of the bag was proper be-
cause it was not the kind of receptacle "worthy" of a protected
privacy interest.' 7 The United States was satisfied with the deci-
sion because it left the prosecution's case intact. But the rest of
12. Albert was charged with violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1976), which reads in
part: "[I]t shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally . . . (1) to
manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, dis-
tribute, or dispense, a controlled substance." Heroin is a controlled substance by
definition of 21 U.S.C. § 812 (c) Schedule 1 (b)(10) (1976).
13. Albert did not testify at the pre-trial suppression hearing. At trial, Albert
tried to convince the jury that he did not know the bag was in his trunk when he
was arrested in order to contest the intent requirement of the'crime of possession
with intent to distribute.
14. 102 S. Ct. at 2160.
15. See infra notes 64-74 and accompanying text. The United States Supreme
Court in Sanders rejected the government's argument that the search of contain-
ers and automobiles is to be governed by the same fourth amendment standard.
16. For discussion of reasonable expectation of privacy see infra notes 54 and
55.
17. Even though the court of appeals reversed Albert's conviction, it remanded
his case to the trial court for a new trial instructing the court to exclude the items
found in Albert's leather pouch, but allowing the introduction of the contents of
the paper bag.
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the court of appeals was not content with the three-member
panel's "worthy/not worthy" distinction.
An en banc court of appeals chose to rehear the case on its own
motion.18 It heard arguments from both sides on the issue of
whether the owner of a paper sack may lay claim to fourth
amendment protection for the privacy of its contents.19 The court
reviewed Arkansas v. Sanders and, as a result, determined the
fourth amendment made no distinction between a paper bag and
a pouch.20 Since both bag and pouch are capable of being recep-
tacles of privacy, the search of the paper bag must have been ille-
18. 102 S. Ct. at 2161.
19. The court of appeals, en banc, first disposed of two points not raised by the
government in its original proceeding before the court of appeals. First, the gov-
ernment argued Arkansas v. Sanders should not have retroactive effect on Ross,
since proceedings in Ross had been initiated prior to the decision in Sanders.
(See United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 535 (1975)). The court, however, rea-
soned that when a decision "does not expand the exclusionary rule, but merely
restates and applies doctrine already in place," police officers have notice of the
rule and their good faith reliance on the doctrine is not disturbed. 655 F.2d at 1162.
Second, the government argued that Albert did not have standing to complain of
fourth amendment violations. The government ironically argued for the retroactiv-
ity of United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980). The Court in Salvucci ex-
pressly overruled the "automatic standing" rule of United States v. Jones, 362 U.S.
257 (1960), allowing defendants in possession cases to challenge searches and
seizures producing evidence against them without having to make proof of stand-
ing. SaIvucci requires defendants to prove a violation of their personal ownership
rights before claiming the benefit of the exclusionary rule. Since Albert claimed
not to know about the paper bag when he testified at trial, the government argued
he did not meet the Salvucci burden.
Still the court of appeals stated that the Supreme Court meant for Jones to bind
the district courts. 655 F.2d at 1165. See 448 U.S. at 85. Even if Salvucci applied,
the jury convicted Albert of possession, necessarily determining that Albert had
possession of the paper bag when he was arrested.
20. The court of appeals considered, but expressly rejected the position ulti-
mately taken by the Supreme Court in Ross (that the search in Ross could be dis-
tinguished from the search in Sanders, see infra text accompanying note 64), on
the ground that the police in Sanders had focused on a specific container before
searching the car, whereas the police in Ross did not. Judge Ginsburg believed
that, based on the resolution of the conflict between United States v. Finnegan, 568
F.2d 637 (9th Cir. 1977), and United States v. Stevie, 582 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir. 1978)
(en banc), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 911 (1979), by the Supreme Court in Sanders, the
point had been decided. In Finnegan, police inquiry was directed toward an auto-
mobile, but in Stevie, the police had focused on a particular piece of luggage
placed in the car, just as in Sanders. The Ninth Circuit ignored the reasoning later
adopted in Sanders (see United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977), and discus-
sion infra notes 57-63 and accompanying text), and permitted the warrantless
search of a container found in the car. The Eighth Circuit, however, followed the
Sanders rationale and found the search of the luggage unlawful. Judge Ginsburg
interpreted the Sanders Court as finding in favor of the Stevie decision, noting
that the Ninth Circuit later reversed its direction and followed Sanders. 655 F.2d
gal, too. To decide otherwise would be to discriminate against the
poor who could not afford to house their effects in expensive lug-
gage.2 1 The court of appeals felt its decision was constrained by
Sanders which proscribed the warrantless search of all contain-
ers in which their owners may repose an expectation of privacy.
Even with this decision, however, the court remained bitterly
divided.22
In the meantime, the United States Supreme Court decided
Robbins v. California.23 Robbins presented the Court with its
first opportunity to apply the language in Sanders (relied upon by
the court of appeals in Ross) to the fact situation for which it was
intended.24 The Court in Robbins affirmed Sanders in all re-
at 1167 n.20. See also United States v. Medina-Verdugo, 637 F.2d 649, 652-53 (9th
Cir. 1980).
Judge Ginsburg, writing for the majority, then went on to address the point of
whether the fourth amendment protects paper bags to the same extent it does lug-
gage. She began by finding the warrantless search of the car lawful. She also
agreed that the warrantless seizure of the containers in Albert's trunk was permis-
sible. 655 F.2d at 1168. She could not, however, agree that the exception to the
warrant requirement authorizing the warrantless search of the car extended to in-
clude the warrantless search of the containers as the government contended. Id.
at 1169. The government- attempted to fashion a new exception for containers
when they are "too small, too insecure, or too cheaply made to burden the time of
a magistrate." Id. at 1170. The Sanders decision made it clear that the contents of
all containers must be protected from warrantless searches unless it was plain to
the searching officer that contraband was hidden within. Moreover, the rule ar-
gued for by the government would eventually prove unworkable, forcing the police
to contend with the "fine distinctions" between worthy and non-worthy containers.
Id. Judge Ginsburg noted, however, that some circuits had adopted just such a
distinction. See id. at 1166 n.16.
21. Any distinction between worthy and non-worthy containers would "snare
those without the means or the sophistication to use worthy containers." 655 F.2d
at 1170.
22. Judge Tamm disagreed with the court's determination as to the paper bag.
He would have found its warrantless search proper on the grounds that Albert's
expectation of privacy in its contents was diminished. Id. at 1171. Judge MacKin-
non would have found the search of both containers permissible, distinguishing
Sanders as a case dealing with luggage, classifying the pouch and paper bag as
non-luggage. Id. at 1180. Judge Robb agreed with Judge Tamm as to the paper
bag, but concurred with Judge Tamm's opinion on the pouch only because he felt
compelled to do so by "recent decisions of the Supreme Court." Id. Judge Wilkey
launched into a voluminous dissent arguing that Sanders should not be given ret-
roactive effect and that the entire inquiry was beyond the court's constitutional
authority. Id. at 1181. Judge Wilkey would have upheld both searches on the basis
of previous Supreme Court precedent.
The court of appeals opinion in Ross is a good example of the kind of confusion
engendered by Arkansas v. Sanders.
23. Robbins was decided on July 1, 1981.
24. The Court in Sanders extended the rule of the case far beyond what was
needed to dispose of the facts before it. As a result, it decided that the fourth
amendment would never permit the warrantless search of containers in an other-
wise lawfully stopped automobile, even where the containers were not specifically
identified by police as containing contraband before making the stop. 442 U.S. at
761-62. The policeman in Sanders knew exactly what he was looking for (a green
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spects.25 Although Robbins came too late to influence the court of
appeals in Albert's case, it appeared to dispose of the issue on ap-
peal to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court decided to review the decision in Ross be-
cause it was dissatisfied with the way the court of appeals framed
the issue. The Supreme Court was reluctant to see the whole
area of law become bogged down into forcing judges to decide, in
each case, which containers would be afforded fourth amendment
protection. Before committing itself to that line of reasoning, the
Court wanted to re-examine the Robbins/Sanders rule in an ad-
versary proceeding. For that reason, the Court instructed both
parties to address the question of whether Robbins (and the
passages in Sanders which spawned Robbins) should stand.26
That instruction necessarily involved the respective treatment
of three lines of cases. 27 United States v. Ross was born out of the
convergence of those lines. However, Justice Stevens ultimately
chose to ignore one of them in his opinion for the majority.28
Rather than a disavowal, Stevens' decision not to treat that line
serves to underscore the focus of this paper: a majority of the
Court believes the warrant requirement is useless, at least insofar
as automobiles are concerned.
III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Automobile Cases
The emergence and popularization of the automobile as an in-
strument of crime has continually hindered, at least in part, at-
tempts to provide for the orderly development of fourth
suitcase) when he stopped the car in which Sanders was riding. Id. at 755. But the
highway patrolmen in Robbins did not know where the marijuana might have
been hidden (or if it even existed), or in what type of container it might have been
hidden. See infra notes 75-93 and accompanying text. The Court in Sanders did
not see this as making any difference, even though Chief Justice Burger pointed it
out in his concurring opinion. 442 U.S. at 766-68.
25. 453 U.S. at 425.
26. 454 U.S. 891 (1981).
27. See infra notes 29-119 and accompanying text for discussion of historical
background of Ross. The three lines of cases are those involving the warrantless
search of automobiles (see infra notes 29-52), the warrantless search of closed con-
tainers found in an automobile during a lawful search (see infra notes 53-98), and
the "bright-line" cases. See infra notes 99-119 and accompanying text for defini-
tion and general description of bright-line rules.
28. Justice Stevens did not treat the bright-line cases in his opinion for the
majority.
amendment principles. Criminals nationwide have only too hap-
pily transferred their illegal activities to the automobile urging, at
the same time, the same measure of protection for the mobile
cars that the fourth amendment provides for their stationary
homes. Unwilling, however, to make the fourth amendment the
dupe of bootleggers, specifically, the Supreme Court fashioned its
so-called "automobile exception" to the warrant requirement in
Carroll v. United States. 29
By its terms, the exception allows police officers to stop and
search a car without a warrant as long as the officers have prob-
able cause to believe the vehicle is transporting contraband. 30
The proper scope of such a search was not really addressed in
Carroll and has remained a missing piece of the overall puzzle
ever since.3 1
Carroll arises out of the late, great attempt of the United States
to enforce sobriety. Officers of the United States were empow-
ered by the National Prohibition Act 32 to enforce the eighteenth
amendment to the Constitution33 by seizing contraband liquor for
subsequent court-ordered destruction. The officers were required
by the Act to obtain a search warrant if the exercise of their duty
carried them into a "private dwelling."34 If a private dwelling was
29. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
30. The fourth amendment of the Constitution generally requires a warrant
before any search and seizure may take place. But when that rule has proved un-
workable, police have been excused from their violation of the fourth amendment
because of the exigent circumstances accompanying the situation making the pro-
curing of a warrant unreasonable. See infra notes 101-105 and accompanying text
for discussion of exceptions to the warrant requirement.
31. One of the Ross Court's avowed purposes was to supply that missing
piece. 102 S. Ct. at 2159.
32. Ch. 85, 41 Stat. 305 (1919).
33. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII (repealed 1933, see U.S. CONST. amend. XXI),
which reads in part:
Section 1. [TIhe manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating li-
quors within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof from
the United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for
beverage purposes is hereby prohibited.
Section 2. The Congress and the several States shall have concurrent
power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
34. An Act Supplemental to the National Prohibition Act, ch. 134, 42 Stat. 222,
223-24 (1921). Section 6 of the Supplemental Act reads:
That any officer, agent, or employee of the United States engaged in the
enforcement of this Act, or the National Prohibition Act, or any other law
of the United States, who shall search any private dwelling as defined in
the National Prohibition Act, and occupied as such dwelling, without a
warrant directing such search, or who while so engaged shall without a
search warrant maliciously and without reasonable cause search any
other building or property, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon con-
viction thereof shall be fined for a first offense not more than $1,000, or im-
prisoned not more than one year, or both such fine and imprisonment.
Id.
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entered without a warrant, the offending officers could be fined up
to $1,000 and imprisoned for up to one year. However, the statute
specifically directed the officers to seize contraband liquor being
transported in a "wagon, buggy, automobile, water or aircraft, or
other vehicle" without a warrant, because Congress recognized
that by the time enforcement officers could obtain a warrant, the
object of the search would often be gone.3 5 The mobile nature of
motor vehicles made it virtually impossible for officers to both ob-
tain a warrant and still be certain of making the seizure.36
A federal prohibition agent, posing as a prospective client, con-
tracted with three suspected bootleggers for the purchase and de-
livery of three cases of whiskey. The bootleggers, Messrs.
Carroll, Kiro, and Kruska, suspicious of "Mr. Stafford" (Agent
Cronenwett), left to get the whiskey but returned in forty-five
minutes claiming to be unable to find their contact. They prom-
ised to deliver the whiskey some time during the next day, but
wisely made no attempt to get back in touch with Mr. Stafford.
While patrolling the road leading from Grand Rapids, Michigan
to Detroit two and one-half months after the night-time meeting,
Cronenwett, another prohibition agent, and a state patrolman ob-
served an Oldsmobile roadster they recognized as belonging to
35. 267 U.S. at 144-47. Chief Justice Taft gleaned this from the legislative his-
tory leading up to the enactment of the Supplemental Act, specifically § 6. The
House judiciary committee objected to the predecessor § 6 (known as the Stanley
Amendment) because it penalized the warrantless search of "property or prem-
ises" instead of only "private dwellings." The committee reported an amended § 6
with the words "private dwellings" (and an accompanying definition) substituted
for "property or premises" on the grounds that the latter restriction would pro-
hibit all warrantless searches and "cripple enforcement of the National Prohibi-
tion Act." The judiciary committee continued by warning that if officers are
required to obtain search warrants before searching any "property" or "premise,"
"it will make it impossible to stop the rum-running automobiles engaged in like
illegal traffic." Chief Justice Taft related that the effect of the judiciary report on
Congress was the adoption of a § 6 (different than the House judiciary committee
version) penalizing warrantless searches of "private dwellings," but merely requir-
ing good faith and probable cause to search any other "building or other prop-
erty." The Chief Justice concluded: "[section 6] left the way open for searching an
automobile, or vehicle of transportation, without a warrant, if the search was not
malicious or without probable cause." Id. at 147.
The foregoing is important because it was relied upon extensively by Justice
Stevens in his Ross majority opinion. See 102 S. Ct. at 2163. See also infra notes
121-30 and accompanying text.
36. 267 U.S. at 146. Chief Justice Taft quoted from the House report as follows:
"lit is impossible to get a warrant to stop an automobile. Before a warrant could
be secured the automobile would be beyond the reach of the officer with its load of
illegal liquor disposed of."
the "Carroll boys" pass them going the opposite direction. The of-
ficers turned their car around and began to follow. The Carroll
boys apparently did not recognize the officers and therefore did
not attempt to flee. The officers stopped the Oldsmobile. Al-
though an immediate search of the car proved unsuccessful,
Agent Cronenwett bumped against the back of the front seat
while looking underneath and felt something hard. When the up-
holstery of the seatback was ripped open, sixty-eight bottles of
whiskey and gin previously concealed in the seat where the fill
material had been removed were exposed.
The Supreme Court posed the issue as whether the distinction
made by Congress in' the National Prohibition Act between dwell-
ing places and vehicles, in terms of the requirement of a search
warrant, was permissible under the fourth amendment.3 7 The
Court began its analysis of the issue with the now famous state-
ment, that the "Fourth Amendment is to be construed in the light
of what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it
was adopted, and in a manner which will conserve public inter-
ests, as well as the interests and rights of individual citizens. '38
While the first proposition is debatable, the second is well ac-
cepted as a rule for determining reasonableness in a search.
What is reasonable under the fourth amendment necessarily de-
pends on a balancing of the need to maintain the security of the
public with the right of the individual to be left alone. 39 Chief
Justice Taft, however, focused on the first principle in his search
for authority.
The penalty for transporting liquor under the National Prohibi-
tion Act was forfeiture of the liquor and the means used in trans-
porting it.40 The Court analogized this penalty to the process of
forfeiture of goods for non-payment of imposts and duties under
37. Id. at 147.
The intent of Congress to make a distinction between the necessity for a
search warrant in the searching of private dwellings and in that of
automobiles and other road vehicles in the enforcement of the Prohibition
Act is thus clearly established. . . . Is such a distinction consistent with
the Fourth Amendment? We think that it is. The Fourth Amendment
does not denounce all searches or seizures, but only such as are
unreasonable.
Id.
38. Id. at 149.
39. See Robbins, 453 U.S. at 437 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). If an impediment
to law enforcement efforts is not somehow balanced by a reciprocal benefit to the
public in the form of heightened security from unreasonable governmental intru-
sion, then the impediment is unjustified.
40. The liquor was ordered destroyed, and the vehicle used to transport the
liquor was impounded until it could be sold at public auction with the proceeds
going into the United States Treasury.
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the original Revenue Act of 1789.41 The Court cited a portion of
the Act which authorized officers of the United States to enter
upon any "ship or vessel" to seize forfeitable goods without a war-
rant.42 Conversely, the Act required officers to obtain a warrant if
they wanted to enter a "particular dwelling house, store, building,
or other place." The Court reasoned that the Congress which en-
acted the Revenue Act of 1789 was the same Congress which rati-
fied the fourth amendment. 43 By inference, then, that Congress-
composed of Constitutional Congress conferees as well-recog-
nized a distinction between habitable places and moving vehicles
in terms of the requirement of a search warrant. The Court re-
ferred to similar provisions in subsequent acts and concluded it
had proven contraband goods in automobiles could be seized
without a warrant.4
The Court did not stop there. It went on to explain that not all
warrantless searches of vehicles would be permissible. Officers of
the United States were still under a duty to obtain a warrant
41. Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, 1 Stat. 29.
42. Id. at 43. Section 24 of the Act reads:
That every collector, naval officer and surveyor, or other person specially
appointed by either of them for that purpose, shall have full power and
authority, to enter any ship or vessel, in which they shall have reason to
suspect any goods, wares or merchandise subject to duty shall be con-
cealed; and therein to search for, seize, and secure any such goods, wares
or merchandise; and if they shall have cause to suspect a concealment
thereof, in any particular dwelling-house, store, building, or other place,
they or either of them shall, upon application on oath or affirmation to any
justice of the peace, be entitled to a warrant to enter such house, store, or
other place (in the day time only) and there to search for such goods, and
if any shall be found, to seize and secure the same for trial; and all such
goods, wares and merchandise, on which duties shall not have been paid
or secured, shall be forfeited.
Id. See generally Act of August 4, 1790, ch. 35 §§ 48-51, 1 Stat. 145, 170; Act of Feb-
ruary 18, 1793, ch. 8, § 27, 1 Stat. 305, 315; Act of March 2, 1799, ch. 22, §§ 68-71, 1 Stat.
627, 677-78.
43. 267 U.S. at 151.
Thus contemporaneously with the adoption of the Fourth Amendment
we find in the First Congress, and in the following Second and Fourth
Congresses, a difference made as to the necessity for a search warrant be-
tween goods subject to forfeiture, when concealed in a dwelling house or
similar place, and like goods in course of transportation and concealed in
a movable vessel where they readily could be put out of reach of a search
warrant.
Id.
44. Id. at 151-53; see, e.g., Act of March 3, 1815, § 2, 3 Stat. 231, 232, codified in
§ 3061 of the Revised Statutes; see also Cotzhausen v. Nazro, 107 U.S. 215, 219
(1882) (customs officer not liable for warrantless seizure of mail unlawfully im-
ported into United States).
"whenever practicable." 45 The rule would be enforced by requir-
ing an officer who had conducted a warrantless search to carry
the burden of proving he had probable cause to conduct the
search. Failure to carry the burden would necessitate returning
the liquor and means of transporting it to the arrestee, essentially
setting him free, while exposing the officer to a civil suit for
money damages for violating the arrestee's constitutional rights.46
Officers were encouraged to obtain warrants whenever there was
a question of practicability by insulating them from such civil ac-
tions if they conducted the search pursuant to a warrant.47 Inher-
ent in the foregoing is the belief that the judgment of the
magistrate is somehow better than that of the prohibition agent.
No other reason existed for offering the agents the bone of civil
immunity.
The Carroll Court's analysis may be inadequate because it
takes for granted the possibility that Congress, when enacting the
revenue acts spoken of, expected the fourth amendment to have a
broader protective scope than that expressed in the particular
acts of legislation. The Court in Carroll, however, does no more
than state, in a very conclusory fashion, that the rule it formu-
lated48 was in "keeping with the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment."49 The Court needed to do more than merely recite
a test. It failed to conduct the kind of searching policy analysis
which Congress made in exempting the search of vehicles from
the warrant requirement. It is not the job of the legislature to es-
tablish fourth amendment boundaries. After Carroll, the legal
45. "In cases where the securing of a warrant is reasonably practicable, it
must be used. ... 267 U.S. at 156.
46. Id. at 155-56.
It follows from this that if an officer seizes an automobile or the liquor
in it without a warrant and the facts as subsequently developed do not
justify a judgment of condemnation and forfeiture, the officer may escape
costs or a suit for damages by a showing that he had reasonable or prob-
able cause . ..
We here find the line of distinction between legal and illegal seizures of
liquor in transport in vehicles .... [The distinction] gives the owner of
an automobile or other vehicle seized under section 26, in absence of prob-
able cause, a right to have restored to him the automobile, it protects him
under the Weeks [Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914)] and Amos
[Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921)] Cases from use of the liquor
as evidence against him, and it subjects the officer making the seizures to
damages.
Id.
47. Id. at 156. "[W]hen [the warrant is] properly supported by affidavit and
issued after judicial approval [it] protects the seizing officer against a suit for
damages. In cases where seizure is impossible except without warrant, the seizing
officer acts unlawfully and at his peril unless he can show the court probable
cause." United States v. Kaplan, 286 F.2d 963, 972 (S.D.C. 1923).
.48. See supra notes 30, 44-47 and accompanying text.
49. 267 U.S. at 159.
[Vol. 10: 421, 1983] Search and Seizure
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
community was still left wondering what the fourth amendment
really required.
Another important automobile search case was presented to the
Court in Chambers v. Maroney.50 In Chambers, the Court
stressed that while the exigency justifying the initial warrantless
seizure of the moving automobile is eliminated with the seizure,
an immediate search is still proper under Carroll.5 ' The Court
wanted to establish that the Carroll decision was not dependent
upon an immediate search being the only alternative to letting
the car's driver go free for lack of a search warrant. The Court in
Texas v. White52 made this clear when it allowed a car to be
seized and impounded at police headquarters until a warrant
could be obtained to authorize the search.
The line of automobile cases would appear to have been dispos-
itive of the issue raised in Ross. But there was another line of
cases dealing with the search of closed containers found in an au-
tomobile during a lawful search with which the Court in Ross had
to contend.
B. Container Cases
The container cases owe their existence to Katz v. United
States. 53 The Supreme Court in Katz disposed of the notion that
fourth amendment protection applies only to places. Katz made
clear that the fourth amendment protects people, and thus, is not
50. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
51. Id. at 52. The Court refused to recognize any difference between "seizing
and holding a car" before getting a warrant, and making an immediate search of
the car. "[E]ither course is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment." Id. This
issue becomes important in Ross when the Court attempts to expand the scope of
Carroll. Since warrantless searches are tied to the exigent circumstances which
justify their existence, the majority stressed this reasoning from Chambers in or-
der not to unnecessarily restrict the justificational basis of the automobile excep-
tion. 102 S. Ct. at 2163 n.9. Justice Marshall picked up on this argument in his
dissenting opinion. See infra note 152 and accompanying text. Justice Marshall
read Carroll as stating that the policeman's only alternative to an immediate
search of the automobile is letting the car and driver go for lack of a warrant. For
this reason, the automobile exception to the warrant requirement could not be
stretched beyond excusing the immediate warrantless search of the automobile.
The Court in Carroll justified nothing else in Justice Marshall's view.
52. 423 U.S. 67 (1975). See also 102 S. Ct. at 2163 n.9.
53. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Katz involved the warrantless, electronic surveillance
of an individual's conversation in a public phone booth. The government argued
that the public locality of the phone booth took it out from under the kind of
fourth amendment protection provided for dwelling places. The Court rejected
this theory.
tied to traditional notions of privacy in dwellings. 54 The rule de-
rived from Katz is that fourth amendment protection extends to
whatever the individual reasonably expects to keep private from
the government, and wherever he expects such privacy.55 It is a
two-fold inquiry: first, a subjective determination of whether the
particular individual in a particular situation really had an expec-
tation of privacy, and second, whether that expectation is reason-
able when balanced against the security interest of the public.56
In Chadwick v. United States, 57 the Supreme Court was
presented with its first opportunity to apply the Katz rule to a
factual setting involving closed containers found in an automobile
during a search. Federal narcotics agents in San Diego, California
became suspicious when a 200-pound footlocker leaking talcum
powder58 was loaded onto a train going to Boston. Agents in Bos-
ton were notified that the footlocker might contain contraband.
They stopped the footlocker while it was still in transit and had a
trained dog smell its exterior for traces of narcotics. The dog re-
acted positively, signalling the presence of narcotics inside. The
agents did not seize the footlocker at that point, but allowed it to
proceed to the baggage terminal. They watched as Chadwick and
his two companions picked the footlocker up and carried it to
their car. The three men placed the footlocker in the trunk, but
did not close the trunk lid. Before Chadwick could start his car,
the agents arrested him and his companions. The footlocker was
then removed to a secured place where it was opened, revealing a
large quantity of marijuana. No search warrant was obtained.
At the trial level, the government argued that the warrantless
search was excused by the Carroll exception to the warrant re-
quirement. The trial court rejected the argument and found the
54. Id. at 351. The Supreme Court in United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1
(1977), interpreted Katz as follows: "We do not agree that the Warrant Clause pro-
tects only dwellings and other specifically designated locales. As we have noted
before, the Fourth Amendment 'protects people not places,' Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967); more particularly, it protects people from unreasonable
governmental intrusions into their legitimate expectations of privacy." Id. at 7.
55. 389 U.S. at 351-52. Katz has come to stand for the proposition that the
fourth amendment protects the individual's "reasonable expectation of privacy."
See 102 S. Ct. at 2173 (Powell, J., concurring).
56. Stated in this way, the rule in Katz is identical to the rule stated in Car-
roll, except that Katz has come to symbolize an expansion of fourth amendment
protection. See supra text accompanying notes 38 and 39. Although no one has
picked up on this coincidence, such an evaluation would have proved interesting
in Ross because the Carroll decision would have been viewed as being much
broader.
57. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
58. Talcum powder is a substance which the narcotics officers recognized as
typically used to mask marijuana odors.
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search to have been illegal.59 On appeal to the Supreme Court
the government changed its tactic and argued that the justifica-
tion behind the Carroll exception applied equally well to luggage,
which was just as mobile, and that the warrantless search of the
contents of Chadwick's footlocker was therefore reasonable.60
The United States made the mistake of pressing a losing argu-
ment to its logical conclusion: it contended in its briefs to the
Supreme Court that the fourth amendment applied only to cer-
tain core areas of privacy. The government forced the Court into
rejecting this argument unanimously. 61
The Court ruled that the warrantless search was unreasonable
because the fourth amendment protects a luggage owner's rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in the contents of his luggage.6 2
That expectation in the contents of luggage was found to be
greater than the expectation of privacy in the interior of an auto-
mobile. Because police could more easily detain luggage while
securing a search warrant, they were required to do so in Chad-
wick's case.6 3
Arkansas v. Sanders6 4 came up to the Supreme Court with
practically the same set of facts. A Little Rock policeman was
given the tip that Sanders would arrive at a certain time, on a
certain flight, carrying a green suitcase full of marijuana. The of-
ficer waited at the terminal until someone matching Sanders'
59. United States v. Chadwick, 393 F. Supp. 763, 772 (D. Mass. 1975).
In this case, there was no nexus between the search and the automobile,
merely a coincidence. The challenged search in this case was one of a
footlocker, not an automobile. The search took place not in an automobile,
but in [the federal building[. The only connection that the automobile
had to this search was that, prior to its seizure, the footlocker was placed
on the floor of the automobile's open trunk.
See 102 S. Ct. at 2165 n.13.
60. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at pp. 13-16, United States v. Chadwick, 433
U.S. 1 (1977); Petitioner's Brief at pp. 37-46, Chadwick.
61. Although Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist dissented, they, along with
the other justices, expressed their disapproval of the government's "extreme view
of the Fourth Amendment that would restrict the protection of the Warrant Clause
to private dwellings and a few other 'high privacy' areas." 433 U.S. at 17-18 (Black-
mun, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 13. The luggage owner's expectation of privacy is not diminished in
the same way that the automobile owner's expectation of privacy is legitimately
diminished. In fact, the luggage owner's expectation of privacy is greater than the
automobile owner's.
63. Id. Once the officers had Chadwick's footlocker safely in their possession,
"it was unreasonable to undertake the additional and greater intrusion of a search
without a warrant."
64. 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
description retrieved a green suitcase. The officer watched as
Sanders loaded the suitcase in the trunk of a taxi which drove off.
Before proceeding too far, the officer stopped the cab, opened the
trunk and then the suitcase, finding the marijuana he was looking
for. He did not have a search warrant.
The Court could have disposed of Sanders' fourth amendment
claim by merely citing Chadwick.65 But for some reason the
Court decided to take the Chadwick principle further than it
needed to decide the case before it. Perhaps it felt constrained to
do so when the State of Arkansas tried to distinguish its case
from Chadwick on the basis that the taxi, in which Sanders was
riding, was already in motion when the policeman stopped it,
whereas Chadwick's car was still parked. 66 Arkansas argued that
this fact brought the case under the Carroll exception because
the connection between the automobile and the suitcase was real
in Sanders' case, while it was just "coincidental" in Chadwick's.67
The Court remained unconvinced, believing that the prosecu-
tion was still trying to use the automobile as a way of avoiding the
warrant requirement by waiting for contraband goods to be
placed in an automobile before making the seizure and search.
The Court viewed the issue as being whether Carroll should be
extended to allow warrantless searches of containers found in a
car. The Court refused to do so. 68 It reasoned that the Carroll ex-
ception could never apply to luggage which, once seized, cannot
be transported. The Court stated that the expectation of privacy
in luggage is not diminished by its presence in an automobile. 69
Police are under a duty to seize containers and present them to a
magistrate for a warrant.7 0
65. Chief Justice Burger, in his concurring opinion, argued that Chadwick and
Sanders were indistinguishable. He chided the majority for treating Sanders as if
the automobile exception to the warrant requirement were at issue; he believed it
was not. In that case, Sanders did not warrant the extra discussion which Justice
Powell gave it. See 442 U.S. at 766-68 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
66. Petitioner's Brief at 30, Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
67. Justice Stevens would later write that the "nexus" between the automobile
and the object of the search in both Chadwick and Sanders was "coincidental."
102 S. Ct. at 2166-67 (quoting Arkansas v. Sanders 442 U.S. at 766-67 (Burger, C.J.,
concurring)). That being so, the scope of the automobile exception to the warrant
requirement was not at issue in those cases.
68. 442 U.S. at 762-63.
69. "Accordingly, as a general rule there is no greater need for warrantless
searches of luggage taken from automobiles than of luggage taken from other
places." Id. at 763-64. The fact that luggage rides in an automobile, which has a
diminished expectation of privacy, does not lessen the expectation of privacy in
the luggage itself. Justice Stevens apparently believes, however, that it does. 102
S. Ct. 2171; see infra notes 134-36 and accompanying text.
70. 442 U.S. at 766.
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The concurring opinion of Chief Justice Burger 7l added an in-
teresting sidelight to Sanders. The Chief Justice felt that the au-
tomobile exception to the warrant requirement was not at issue in
Chadwick or Sanders.72 The focus of the police officer's search
was a specific piece of luggage which he could have seized, having
probable cause to do so, before it was placed in the trunk of the
car or cab. For this reason, the relationship between the automo-
bile and the suitcase and the footlocker was "purely coinciden-
tal."73 He argued that the Court did not need to go further and
implicate all warrantless searches of containers found in a law-
fully stopped automobile. The facts of Chadwick and Sanders
were special; the general rule of law established by the Court in
Sanders was overbroad and unnecessary. 74
Robbins v. California was the unfortunate result of the unnec-
essary language described above in Arkansas v. Sanders. Robbins
had been smoking a considerable amount of marijuana and
should not have been driving. Two California highway patrolmen
stopped him because they viewed his progress as "erratic." Rob-
bins stepped out of his car and approached the patrol car. He be-
gan to converse with one of the patrolmen until he was asked to
produce his driver's license. He had not brought it with him, so
he returned to his car. One of the patrolmen followed him. When
Robbins opened his car door, a plume of marijuana smoke
greeted the officer. Robbins was arrested for possession of
marijuana.
The police searched Robbins' car. They worked their way to the
back of the compact station wagon, opened the tailgate and found
a recessed luggage compartment under the carpeting. They
opened it and discovered two packages wrapped in opaque, green
plastic. Without a warrant, they opened the packages and found a
large supply of marijuana in each.
When the case first appeared before the Supreme Court, Sand-
ers had only recently been decided. The California Court of Ap-
peals was instructed to review its affirmance of Robbins'
71. The Chief Justice was joined by Justice Stevens, the author of the majority
opinion in Ross.
72. See supra note 65.
73. 442 U.S. at 767 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
74. The overbroad nature of the Sanders opinion forced the Ross Court to
eliminate some of the language in Sanders. See infra note 176 and accompanying
text.
conviction in light of the Sanders decision. 75 California reached
the same result and the Court granted certiorari.76 In an opinion
joined only by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and White, Justice
Stewart reversed the court of appeals.
Justice Stewart said the language in Chadwick and Sanders
compelled the result.7 7 He noted that in both cases the Court had
been urged to expand the scope of the automobile exception to
the warrant requirement in order to permit the warrantless
search of containers found inside.7 8 The Court refused to do so
then because the two circumstances justifying a warrantless
search of an automobile did not apply to containers. First, con-
tainers are no longer mobile once their owner has been placed in
police custody.7 9 Second, the container owner's expectation of
privacy is not diminished in the same way the automobile
driver/owner's expectation is diminished.80 The automobile
driver voluntarily exposes himself and the contents of his vehicle
to law enforcement officials of the state, and the state takes it
upon itself to regulate the use of the vehicle. The same cannot be
said for the owner of packages or containers.8 1
Justice Stewart also rejected the state's argument that the na-
ture of the container is relevant to the determination of reason-
able expectations of privacy.82 The state attempted to convince
75. 443 U.S. 903 (1979).
76. People v. Robbins, 103 Cal. App. 3d 34, 41, 162 Cal. Rptr. 780, 783-84 (1980).
The court of appeals stuck with the trial court's decision that Robbins' expectation
of privacy in the contents of the packages, due to the nature of their covering ma-
terial, was too diminished to be protected by the fourth amendment.
77. Justice Stewart stated that "[t]hose cases made clear...that a closed piece
of luggage found in a lawfully searched car is constitutionally protected to the
same extent as are closed pieces of luggage found anywhere else." 453 U.S. at 425.
Justice Stewart apparently relied on the language in Sanders cited supra at note
69 and 442 U.S. at 764-65 n.13.
78. 453 U.S. at 425.
79. Justice Marshall pointed out in his Ross dissent that containers are never
as "mobile" as automobiles because they can more easily be seized and immobi-
lized. 102 S. Ct. at 2176-77. That is why the Carroll rationale of mobility does not
justify the warrantless search of a container on that ground alone. See infra notes
153-56 and accompanying text.
80. See infra note 154 and accompanying text.
81. Justice Stevens did not make the mistake of justifying the warrantless
search of Albert's bag and pouch solely on the ground that the owner's expecta-
tion of privacy is diminished because he places it in an automobile. That reason-
ing was put to rest in Chadwick and Sanders. Justice Stevens would later define
the scope of a Carroll search to include closed containers. See infra text accompa-
nying note 136.
*82. 453 U.S. at 425-26. Justice Stewart was no more willing than Judge Gins-
burg (in her majority opinion for the court of appeals in Ross) to distinguish
among types of containers. See supra note 20. As long as the container is closed
and opaque, such that it evidences the owner's intent to keep it private, the fourth
amendment will protect it.
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the Court that the fourth amendment only protects containers in
which the individual may have placed "personal effects." Justice
Stewart rejected the argument on two grounds: first, neither
Chadwick nor Sanders was decided on that basis; second, such a
determination would be impossible for the Court to make post
hoc, let alone for the police officer to make ad hoc.
Thus, the highway patrolmen's warrantless search of Robbins'
packages was unreasonable. They could have seized the pack-
ages and obtained a search warrant. Because the police had Rob-
bins in custody, the burden of obtaining a warrant would not have
necessitated letting Robbins go free. Sanders spoke specifically
to the situation in Robbins when it declared that just because a
container rides in a car does not mean it may be opened without a
warrant, even though there is probable cause to do s0.83
Justice Powell, the author of the Court's opinion in Sanders,
concurred in the judgment, but not in the Court's "bright-line"84
opinion. He agreed with the plurality85 that Robbins' expectation
of privacy in his packages was not diminished to the point where
a warrantless search was justified.8 6 He was unwilling, however,
to turn that factual determination into a general rule.87 In other
83. 453 U.S. at 425. The foregoing is essentially the argument employed by
Justice Marshall in his dissenting opinion in Ross. See infra note 160 and accom-
panying text.
84. Bright-line rules are discussed infra notes 99-119 and accompanying text.
85. Only three Justices-Brennan, Marshall, and White-joined Justice Stewart's
opinion. Justice Powell concurred separately. The Chief Justice concurred but
did not write an opinion. There was no Court majority in Robbins.
86. 453 U.S. at 429 (Powell, J., concurring).
87. Id. at 432-34. Justice Powell was able to distinguish the three container
cases, (Sanders, Chadwick, Robbins), and New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981)
(search and seizure case decided on same day as Robbins; see infra notes 108-11
and accompanying text) by separating the fourth amendment issue raised in each
case into three categories. Belton, a case so similar to Robbins that it should have
been decided the same way (see 453 U.S. at 444 (Stevens, J., dissenting)), involved
the "scope of the search incident to arrest on the public highway;" Chadwick and
Sanders were decided under the question of "whether officers must obtain a war-
rant when they have probable cause to search a particular container in which the
suspect has a reasonable expectation of privacy;" and Robbins should have been
addressed with reference to "the scope of the 'automobile exception' to the war-
rant requirement, which potentially includes all areas of the car and containers
found therein." 453 U.S. at 40. Justice Stewart incorrectly treated Robbins the
same way the Court treated Chadwick and Sanders. Because the highway patrol-
men had probable cause to search Robbins' car, "rather than...a particular
container that fortuitously is located in it," an immediate search of that container
would not violate the fourth amendment and would be consistent with Chadwick
and Sanders. Whether consciously or not, Justice Powell laid the groundwork for
his concurring opinion in Ross. See infra notes 138-42 and accompanying text.
circumstances, the nature of the package might demand less
stringent fourth amendment protection.88
Justices Blackmun, Rehnquist, and Stevens all dissented on dif-
ferent grounds. Justice Blackmun reminded the reader that he
had dissented in Chadwick and Sanders. He felt the rule coming
from those cases was practically unworkable,8 9 pointing to the di-
vided Court and general confusion among the circuits as
evidence.90
Justice Rehnquist reiterated his own fond belief that the exclu-
sionary rule, with its concomitant preference for search warrants,
is not compelled by the Constitution and creates difficulties for
law enforcement which are not offset by reciprocal benefits to the
public in the form of privacy from unreasonable governmental in-
trusions.9 1 He quoted a portion of Justice Blackmun's dissent
urging the adoption of a "clear-cut rule to the effect that a warrant
should not be required to seize and search any personal property
found in an automobile that may in turn be seized and searched
without a warrant pursuant to Carroll and Chambers."92 Instead
of arguing for an expanded Carroll search, as appears from the
surface of his dissent, Justice Rehnquist accused the Court in
Robbins of unreasonably narrowing the scope of a Carroll
search.93
Justice Stevens felt that the plurality addressed the wrong is-
sue. What was really at issue in Robbins, Sanders, and Chadwick
was the proper scope of a warrantless search conducted by au-
thority of Carroll v. United States.94 He was able to distinguish
Chadwick and Sanders on the ground that the police in both
cases had probable cause to search the footlocker and suitcase,
88. Id. at 433-34.
Confronted with a cigarbox or a Dixie cup in the course of a probable
cause search of an automobile for narcotics, the conscientious policeman
would be required to take the object to a magistrate, ifil out the appropri-
ate forms, await the decision, and finally obtain the warrant.... The ag-
gregate burden of procuring warrants whenever an officer has probable
cause to search the most trivial container may be heavy and will not be
compensated by the advancement of important Fourth Amendment
values.
Id.
89. Id. at 436 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 426, 436.
91. Id. at 438. Justice Rehnquist would have the Court follow Justice Harlan's
advice in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 490-91 (1971) (Harlan, J., con-
curring), and overrule Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), and Ker v. California, 374
U.S. 23 (1963).
92. 453 U.S. at 441; see 442 U.S. at 769, 772 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
93. 453 U.S. at 442-43.
94. Id. at 447-49. This is the position that Justice Stevens took in his majority
opinion in Ross. 102 S. Ct. at 2167-68.
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but not the automobile.95 In this sense, Justice Stevens could not
agree with Justice Blackmun's dissent in all three cases. 96 It was
not the mobility of the container that justified the warrantless
search: it was the exigency of the automobile search itself, ren-
dering anything short of an immediate search of the container
unreasonable. 97
Given the Court's "dictum" in Arkansas v. Sanders it is easy to
see how Justice Stewart reached his conclusion. The decision
was almost unavoidable. Following the Sanders logic, police may
never search a container 98 found in an automobile during a lawful
warrantless search. They must seize it and take it before a magis-
trate to obtain a warrant. Justice Stewart was not troubled by the
fact that in Robbins, as opposed to Chadwick and Sanders, the
police were not looking for a specific container housing contra-
band; they knew they were looking for marijuana, but did not
know where it would be found. Yet the Sanders dictum fore-
closed any such distinction.
Robbins was an unfortunate decision because Sanders was an
unfortunate decision. The Court was herded into carrying Sand-
ers to its logical extreme by the State of Arkansas' overbroad ar-
gument on appeal. Yet Supreme Court Justices are not so easily
herded. Unwilling to be trapped under the opprobrium of the
Sanders dictum, they scurried in all directions in Robbins, leav-
ing a hodge-podge of opinions and theories and no Court majority.
Robbins is useful, though, as it showcases the arguments that
would be made, pro and con, in United States v. Ross. The depar-
ture of Justice Stewart enabled the Court to pull the only remain-
95. 453 U.S. at 446.
96. Justice Stevens believed it was too facile to say that the automobile excep-
tion should allow police officers to search all containers found during a warrant-
less automobile search. Such a general rule would not take into consideration the
possibility of abuse by police who might wait for suspicious looking containers to
be placed in automobiles in order to take advantage of the automobile exception
to the warrant requirement. See id. at 449 n.9.
97. Mobility of the automobile has been rejected as the main justification for
the automobile exception. In Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441-42 (1973), and
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976), warrantless searches of the
automobiles were upheld even where the automobile's mobility was irrelevant.
See 453 U.S. at 424; Justices Stevens and Blackmun disagree on this point as well.
Id. at 440-41 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Blackmun, J., with approval:
"The luggage, like the automobile transporting it, is mobile. Therefore luggage
may be searched.") See id. at 440.
98. Query: what is a container? This was the problem the court of appeals had
with Ross. 655 F.2d at 1168. See supra note 20.
ing thread of support Robbins had and to expose its inherent
weakness, giving the Court new fabric from which to fashion a
new, more durable rule.
C. Bright-Line Cases
One important line of cases which the Court in Ross chose not
to address, being of particular relevance to the focus of this note,
is that of the so-called "bright-line" search and seizure cases. 99
Bright-line rules exist in all aspects of the law. But their applica-
tion to search and seizure cases is so distinct that a general dis-
cussion would not prove useful. Neither would a general
definition be of any help without reference to a particular fact
situation. 00
In Katz v. United States, the Supreme Court stated that a war-
rantless search is "per se unreasonable."101 However, practical
necessity forced the Court to recognize exceptions to the general
rule. Such exceptions were to be "few, specifically established
and well delineated."102 They are justified only because the exi-
gency of the situation requiring the exception would make the ob-
taining of a search warrant unreasonable. Yet exceptions to the
warrant requirement of the fourth amendment do not become
rules in and of themselves. 03 Warrantless searches are merely
excused, not authorized. The burden is always on the party seek-
ing to establish the exception. 04 The scope of the applicability
and the availability of an exception is always subject to judicial
review to see if circumstances justified the lack of a search war-
rant. 0 5 This has been the traditional fourth amendment
philosophy.
The Court departed from this philosophy in United States v.
99. Robbins was most certainly a bright-line case. See 453 U.S. at 429, 436, 443.
However, the plurality and Justice Powell decided to treat Robbins as a "container
case." Id. at 432. Robbins could arguably fit under either category, or both. It was
included in the preceeding section not quite arbitrarily, but because of its exten-
sive reliance on Chadwick and Sanders.
100. See generally Dalton, Tracing the Bright Line Through Search and Seizure:
Robinson, Robbins and Belton, FoRUM Vol. 9, No. 4, 1982, for a discussion of bright-
line rules and their effect on three modem search and seizure cases, each of which
will have been treated in this note.
101. 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
102. Id.
103. "[B ecause an exception is invoked to justify a search without a warrant
does not preclude further judicial inquiry into the reasonableness of that search."
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 243 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
104. Chambers, 399 U.S. 42, 61 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
105. Exceptions to the warrant requirement do not become "talismans," pre-
cluding judicial review wherever they appear. 414 U.S. at 243 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
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Robinson.106 In Robinson, Officer Jenks made a search of Robin-
son's person after arresting him for driving without a license.l07
Jenks felt something hard under Robinson's jacket; he reached
into Robinson's shirt pocket and pulled out a crumpled cigarette
packet. Jenks opened the packet and found capsules containing
white powder, later found to be heroin. The search and seizure of
the capusules was conducted without a search warrant.
The United States argued that the warrantless search was jus-
tified by the exception to the warrant requirement established in
Chimel v. California. 108 Chimel authorized a search of the de-
fendant's person and the area within his immediate control in or-
der to disarm the defendant and to secure any destructible
evidence in the defendant's possession.109 The warrantless
search of Robinson's shirt pocket was arguably justified under the
Chimel exception.
But Justice Rehnquist did not rest his majority opinion there.
The Court reasoned that the search of Robinson's person need
not have been excused by some exception to the warrant require-
ment.11 0 To the contrary, the search was reasonable under the
fourth amendment: the power of police to search the person of
the arrestee being absolute, no warrant was necessary. The right
of police to search the person of an arrestee was not an exception
to the warrant requirement, but a rule in and of itself."'
106. 414 U.S. 218.
107. Officer Jenks pulled Robinson over because he knew he was driving with-
out a license. He had stopped Robinson four days earlier and had then deter-
mined that Robinson's license had been revoked.
108. 395 U.S. 752 (1969). While executing an arrest warrant, police searched
through all of the rooms of the arrestee's house. The search turned up some items
which were excluded because of the impermissible scope of the search.
109. Id. at 763; see New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. at 457.
110. 414 U.S. at 235. Justice Rehnquist said that the authority of the police to
search the person of the arrestee did not depend on an after the fact judicial deter-
mination of exigent circumstances justifying the warrantless search. The warrant-
less search of the arrestee was never unlawful under the fourth amendment-in
contradiction to the rule of Katz. See supra text accompanying notes 101-05.
111. Justice Rehnquist stated that it was the "fact of' the custodial arrest
which authorized Officer Jenks to conduct the warrantless search of Robinson's
person. Such a search "requires no additional justification" because it is not
based on judicial recognition of exigent circumstances. The search itself is always
legal, always "reasonable" under the fourth amendment.
Compare Justice Rehnquist's treatment of the warrantless search incident to ar-
rest as "reasonable," with the Court's statement in Katz that warrantless searches
are "per se unreasonable." 389 U.S. at 357; see supra notes 101-05 and accompany-
ing text. See also LaFave, "Case-by-Case Adjudication" versus "Standardized Pro-
cedures:" The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 127. Professor LaFave
The rationale behind Robinson was relied upon extensively by
the Court in New York v. Belton, 112 decided the same day as Rob-
bins. The disputed search in Belton was that of a zippered pocket
of a leather jacket lying on the back seat of an automobile in
which Belton was a passenger. The car had been stopped for
speeding. The police officer smelled marijuana fumes and ar-
rested Belton and his three cohorts for possession. Then the of-
ficer found cocaine in Belton's jacket pocket.
There was no question that this warrantless search could not
have been justified by the Chimel exception. 113 Justice Stewart,
writing for the majority, did try, however. Yet the Court spoke of
the need for "[a] single, familiar standard. . . to guide police of-
ficers who have only limited time and expertise to reflect on and
balance the social and individual interests involved in the specific
circumstances."" 4 The Court cited the portion from Robinson
which scoffed at the notion that each warrantless search need be
reviewed by the Court to determine whether it fit within the nar-
row parameters of one of the exceptions to the warrant require-
ment.115 The search of Belton's jacket was "reasonable," there
being no need to justify it under the circumstances.
Belton was a bright-line rule for the same reasons that Robin-
son, and arguably Robbins, were bright-line rules.l"6 They at-
understood the Court in Robinson to have deserted the "myth" of the warrantless
search as the exception, and to have replaced case-by-case adjudication for some
form of standardized, bright-line rule for policemen to follow. Id. at 162-63.
Justice Marshall, dissenting in Robinson, stated: "The majority's approach rep-
resents a clear and marked departure from our long tradition of case-by-case adju-
dication of the reasonableness of searches and seizures under the fourth
amendment." 414 U.S. at 239.
112. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
113. Chimel authorized the warrantless search of the person and the area
within his immediate control for two reasons: to disarm the arrestee, protecting
the officer and preventing the arrestee's escape, and to remove any evidence
which could be easily reached by the arrestee - preventing its destruction and
concealment. Justice Stewart's majority opinion in Belton wrenches Chimel com-
pletely out of shape. See Note, New York v. Belton: The Scope of Warrantless
Searches Extended, 9 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 919, 930-31 (1982); see also Dalton, supra
note 100, at 21. First, Belton's jacket was lying on the backseat of the car, not
within his immediate reach or control, while Belton was standing outside and
away from the car with his three cohorts. Second, the officer's search of Belton's
jacket could not have been carried out with the idea of protecting himself since
the lone officer had to turn his back on four individuals, each unrestrained by
handcuffs, in order to search the backseat of the car. 453 U.S. at 456-57. See also
id. at 468 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
114. 453 U.S. at 458 (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213-14 (1978)).
i15. 453 U.S. at 459 (quoting United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235); see
supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
116. A tentative definition of bright-line rules can now be made. In each of the
three cases referred to above (Robinson, Robbins, and Belton), the Court is seen
as doing two things: first, attempting to provide law enforcement officials with a
clear, easy-to-define and apply rule of law for search and seizure situations. The
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tempted to supply a rule capable of consistent application: a rule
that did not require after-the-fact judicial approval, or, in Robbins'
case, disapproval. 1 7 Under the traditional analysis, the govern-
ment had to defend its warrantless search by proving sufficient
facts to invoke one of the exceptions. This approach necessarily
involved a case-by-case analysis. The bright-line approach takes
such a determination away from the court: the government need
show no facts to justify its warrantless search; it need only con-
vince the court that it did not exceed the bounds of the search
which were previously established.
Implicit in the bright-line decisions is the belief that search
Court was sensitive to criticism that past decisions were not consistent and there-
fore attempted, in these three bright-line cases, to remedy the situation and estab-
lish clear search and seizure law which would not need to be changed or
distinguished too frequently by subsequent cases. See, e.g., 453 U.S. 459-60. That
leads to the second element. Bright-line rules, in order to provide the much de-
sired consistency, necessarily preclude judicial review of the circumstances lead-
ing up to the warrantless search. If the search is "reasonable," it is not illegal
under the fourth amendment. 414 U.S. at 226. There is nothing further for the
court to do than ensure that the officers had probable cause, and did not exceed
the scope of the previously authorized search.
117. While Robinson and Belton were bright-line rules authorizing greater po-
lice intrusion, Robbins was a bright-line rule which restricted the scope of police
activity. This interesting phenomena is highlighted by the Court's line-up in the
two cases.
In Belton, Justices Brennan and Marshall objected to the "arbitrary 'bright-line'
rule" fashioned by the Belton majority. 453 U.S. at 463. Justice White dissented be-
cause he thought Belton was a container case which should have been decided the
same way as Robbins. Id. at 472. Justice Stevens concurred saying that he, along
with Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Rehnquist agreed that
Robbins and Belton should have been decided the same way. (Admittedly, Jus-
tices Marshall, Brennan, and White would liked to have seen Belton decided the
same way as Robbins; but it is doubtful that Justices Stevens, Blackmun, and
Rehnquist would have seen Belton decided any other way). Id. at 463. Justice
Stevens saw both cases not as container cases, but as cases involving the scope of
a warrantless automobile search. For reasons stated in his Robbins dissent, he be-
lieved such a search properly should have included Belton's jacket pocket as well
as Robbins' packages. 453 U.S. at 444 and n.1. Justice Rehnquist concurred, albeit
unhappily, wishing that the Court would find the resolve to overrule the exclusion-
ary rule and establish the kind of carte blanche automobile search urged by Jus-
tice Blackmun in Sanders. Id. at 463. see supra notes 92 and 96 and accompanying
text. Justice Blackmun joined Justice Stewart's opinion, as did the Chief Justice,
without an opinion of his own. Yet the Chief Justice concurred, sub silentio, in
Robbins while Justice Blackmun dissented. Justice Stewart is notable for writing
on both sides of the bright-line issue. Compare 453 U.S. 920 with 453 U.S. 454. Ap-
parently, then, the direction bright-line rules will take depends as much as any-
thing, on the hand that holds the pen. See Dalton, supra note 100, at 22.
warrants are an anachronism in today's society. 118 The traditional
notion of warrantless searches being "per se unreasonable"
served to force officers to consider obtaining a warrant if practica-
ble. They were on notice that their determination of exigent cir-
cumstances would be reviewed by the court. But by taking this
review away from the court by calling the Robinson and Belton
searches "reasonable," destroys the presumption of un-
reasonability. Either the search warrant is not an effective deter-
rent to arbitrary exercises of police power, or it is so effective as
to be improvident. In either case, the search warrant requirement
was eliminated in both cases. The question propounded by this
note is whether United States v. Ross is a bright-line case.1 1 9
IV. ANALYSIS
The rule adopted by the Court in United States v. Ross is easy
to state: when police officers have probable cause to stop an auto-
mobile on the street and the object of.their search is not some
specifically identifiable container known to be inside, they may
search the entire car and open any package or container the of-
ficers find inside whether they have a search warrant or not.120 It
is not as easy, however, to say how the Court got to that rule from
where it started.
A. Majority Opinion
When Justice Stevens sat down to pen the majority opinion in
Ross, he had before him the three lines of cases decribed above.
While the automobile and bright-line cases were arguable support
for the position he would ultimately be required to justify, the
container cases stood squarely in his path. He did not consider
distinguishing Ross from the container cases because the facts in
Ross were virtually identical to the facts in Robbins. 121 He only
had two choices: make a frontal attack on the container cases or
118. Making warrantless searches the rule and not the exception necessarily
implicates their usefulness. See 453 U.S. at 469; see also 414 U.S. at 242-43.
119. If United States v. Ross turns out to be a bright-line decision (and there is
little doubt that it is; see infra note 184), it would be the broadest application of
bright-line rules to date. Belton involved just a piece of the overall scope of the
automobile search, and Robbins merely dealt with containers found during the au-
tomobile search. Robinson was fairly broad as it extended warrantless searches to
cover the person of a lawful arrestee. Ross extends the limits to include an entire
automobile.
120. 102 S. Ct. at 2171.
121. If Ross were to be treated as a container case, Justice Stevens' disapproval
of Sanders would have been complete, and would have extended to Chadwick.
Treating Ross as an automobile search case allowed Stevens to cut gingerly
around Sanders and miss Chadwick altogether. See infra notes 167, 176-80 and ac-
companying text.
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fall back and defend his position from the automobile cases. He
chose the latter option.
Justice Stevens' opinion rests on two presumptions about
United States v. Carroll: first, that the Court in Carroll would
have decided the case the same way even if the whiskey bottles
had been concealed in the kind of container which troubled the
Court in Chadwick and Sanders;1 22 and second, that the scope of
the warrantless search in Carroll was as broad as a magistrate
could have authorized if only the police officers had obtained a
search warrant. 123
Stevens' strongest argument in favor of his first presumption is
that the Court in Carroll, and subsequent automobile search
cases, never considered whether there was anything different
about contraband being concealed in a "secondary container."124
This argument is bolstered by the fact that the Carroll Court did
not flinch about the prohibition agents ripping open the back seat
of the roadster which was arguably a form of "container."125 Ste-
vens then cited other automobile search cases in which the
search of containers housing the contraband was upheld without
question by the parties or the Court. 26
Justice Stevens looked next to logic for support of his first pre-
sumption. He said it would be "illogical" for the Court in Carroll,
and the Court in Chambers for that matter, to have decided the
122. Justice Stevens refers to this kind of container as "secondary," impliedly
inferring that its protection of the owner's privacy interest is diminished. 102 S.
Ct. at 2167.
123. Id.
124. In this case, a secondary container would have been a burlap bag (or
something similar) housing the whiskey bottles. See 102 S. Ct. at 2169; see infra
notes 125-26.
125. The Carroll Court did not even discuss this aspect of the case; it appeared
to take for granted that authority to search the car included authority to take it
apart. See 267 U.S. at 158-59.
126. 102 S. Ct. at 2169-70 and nn.23-25; see Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694
(1931) (warrantless search of "whiskey bags"); Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251
(1938) (warrantless search of packages wrapped in brown paper bag tied with
twine). The Court also cited a number of pre-Chadwick/Sanders circuit court
opinions upholding the warrantless searches of containers found during automo-
bile searches. 102 S. Ct. at 2170 n.25.
But that is like winning an argument by default; just because the other side
does not show up, or decided not to argue an issue does not mean that a later
Court should ignore the issue as decided. The short answer to Justice Stevens'
argument is that the Court in Chadwick and Sanders was disturbed by just such a
situation, albeit for the first time, and disallowed it. Justice Stevens is really left
where he started: having to contend with the container cases.
case differently were the contraband housed in a secondary
container.127 If the police in Carroll had not been able to open a
hypothetical burlap bag inside the seat back, or if the police in
Chambers had not been able to open a paper bag crumpled inside
the concealed compartment under the dashboard, it would pro-
duce "absurd results inconsistent with the decision in Carroll
itself."l 28
As final support for his first presumption, Justice Stevens
turned to the "practicability" rationale supposedly underlying the
Carroll decision. 29 The thrust of Carroll was to provide a practi-
cal solution to a thorny problem that would not offend the fourth
amendment. Stevens asserted that the practical advantages of
Carroll would be "nullified" if police could not open containers
found inside a car.' 30
As for the second presumption, Justice Stevens began with the
statement of a general principle of fourth amendment law: "[a]
lawful search of fixed premises generally extends to the entire
area in which the object of the search may be found and is not
limited by the possibility that separate acts of entry or opening
may be required to complete the search."131 When an officer has
a warrant to search a home, he may search all drawers, closets,
and containers in which the object of his search may be found.
There is no opposition to this statement. To apply it to the Ross
situation necessarily presupposes that the warrantless search is
127. 102 S. Ct. at 2169.
128. Id. As Justice Stevens himself pointed out, the Carroll Court did not con-
sider whether a secondary container would have made any difference in the hold-
ing of that case. See supra notes 125-26. That being so, it is impossible to say that
a contrary holding in Ross would be "inconsistent" with Carroll.
129. 102 S. Ct. at 2170. Justice Marshall sorely contests Justice Stevens' theory
of what was truly "practicable" about Carroll. See infra text accompanying note
166.
130. Id. "Contraband goods rarely are strewn across the trunk or floor of the
car; since by their very nature such goods must be withheld from public view, they
are enclosed within some form of container." Id.
Justice Stevens noted that in the early revenue acts (discussed supra at notes
41-44 and accompanying text), the goods subject to duties and imposts would not
be shipped without some form of container to protect them against the elements.
Congress and the Court's silence on this matter imply their acquiescence. 102 S.
Ct. at 2170 n.26.
A discussion of this contention, that containers in cars may be searched for
practical reasons, is also made by Justice Marshall in his dissenting opinion. It
was his opinion that the rationale behind requiring the State of California to ob-
tain a warrant before searching Robbins' packages was based on an assumption
that it was not "impracticable" for police officers to have seized the packages until
a warrant could issue. 102 S. Ct. at 2177. See infra text accompanying notes 155-56,
163-66. Query whether the same rationale would have made a difference to the
Carroll Court.
131. 102 S. Ct. at 2170.
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legally as broad as it would have been with a warrant.132 If con-
tainers must give way to a lawful search under a warrant, there is
no reason why they should not under a warrantless search.133
The search of containers during a warrantless search is expressly
justified by the purposes for which the search is excused; the
same is necessarily true of searches conducted under a warrant.
Even if the foregoing were convincing, Justice Stevens threw in
the coup de grace. If containers must give way to a warrant
search it must be that the owner's expectation of privacy is dimin-
ished or unreasonable. 34 Because of a magistrate's determina-
tion of probable cause, the owner's privacy must yield.135 Since it
is not unreasonable to search an automobile without a warrant, as
long as the police have probable cause, the owner's expectation of
privacy must similarly be diminished, authorizing a warrantless
search. The warrantless search of a container is therefore justi-
fied for the same reasons it would be with a warrant. 136
Justice Stevens, therefore, authorized the warrantless search of
Albert's paper bag and leather pouch on the basis of United
States v. Carroll. It was the Court's opinion that the scope of the
warrantless search in Carroll was at least broad enough to in-
clude containers found inside the car. Justice Stevens was able to
do this without expanding the apparent limits of the Carroll
search. He was also able to do this without casting too much
132. If it were not, the warrantless search would be useless as it would be re-
stricted entirely to the circumstances excusing it-that is, if one follows the tradi-
tional analysis of search and seizure discussed earlier. See supra notes 101-05 and
accompanying text.
133. That, of course, logically follows only if a warrantless search is legally as
broad as a warrant search. As will be seen later, the foregoing depends on a reso-
lution of the question posed by this note: whether a magistrate's determination of
probable cause is worth anything today. If it is not, then the policeman's determi-
nation of probable cause is just as authoritative as a magistrate's, and the scope of
the warrantless search is just a broad as one authorized by a magistrate. Justice
Marshall completely rejects this notion. 102 S. Ct. at 2174; see infra note 144.
134. 102 S. Ct. at 2171-72.
135. The owner's privacy must yield because the magistrate's determination of
probable cause to search the container makes any continued maintenance of pri-
vacy unreasonable.
136. Justice Marshall argued that this analogy was faulty because it failed to
recognize what was decided in Sanders: the expectation of privacy in luggage is
greater than it is in automobiles. 102 S. Ct. at 2177; 442 U.S. at 763-64; see infra
notes 154-56 and accompanying text. That being the case, and admitting, only for
the sake of argument, that the privacy in a package must yield to a magistrate's
warrant, it follows that the privacy interest in a package will always be higher
than in an automobile. Packages are simply different, for fourth amendment pur-
poses, than automobiles. 102 S. Ct. at 2177.
doubt on the container cases, except Robbins, of course. One is
left to wonder why Justice Marshall, in dissent, felt constrained to
publish such a vituperative opinion.
B. Concurring Opinions
But first, the concurring opinions. Justice Blackmun's concur-
rence came as no surprise. He dissented in all three of the
container cases, and was the only Justice, besides Justice Rehn-
quist, so consistent. He was not entirely satisfied with Justice
Stevens' opinion, but felt it did an admirable job of establishing a
clear rule for law enforcement officials to follow.137
Justice Powell's concurrence is interesting. He was the author
of Arkansas v. Sanders. Yet in Ross, he said he concurred in Rob-
bins only because he felt the opinion was "justified, though not
compelled" by Sanders.138 He criticized Robbins for being a
bright-line rule.' 39 Yet at the same time, he praised Justice Ste-
vens' opinion in Ross for performing a bright-line function.140 Jus-
tice Powell felt the Court's decision in Ross was consistent with
the Court's decision in Belton; as such, Justice Powell was the on-
ly Ross justice to declare his allegiance to New York v. Belton. 141
He concurred in Ross because he believed the expectation of pri-
vacy in automobiles is attenuated, inferring that this extended to
containers found in the car as well.142
C. Dissent
Justice Marshall, writing for Justices Brennan and White in dis-
sent, accused the majority of eviscerating the warrant require-
ment of the fourth amendment;143 even worse, it did so without
admitting it openly. Accordingly, the majority committed two her-
137. 102 S. Ct. at 2173 (Blackmun, J., concurring). It appears that Justice Black-
mun, while not wholly satisfied with the majority opinion, joined it also because
he was sensitive to criticisms that the Court writes too many hair-splitting concur-
rences, tending to dilute the cohesiveness of the Court's opinion.
138. Id. (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell could do nothing else but con-
cur in Robbins in light of the fact that it was, arguably, his opinion in Sanders
which forced the result in Robbins.
139. Id.
140. 102 S. Ct. at 2173. Justice Powell said that the Court's opinion in Ross
would provide "specific guidance to police and courts in this recurring situation."
Id. (quoting New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. at 435 (Powell, J., concurring)).
141. Is it possible that Justice Powell viewed Ross as having all the advantages,
but none of the disadvantages of a bright-line rule?
142. Justice Powell also spoke, along with Justice Blackmun, of providing an
authoritative decision with a majority of the justices.
143. "The majority today not only repeals all realistic limits on warrantless au-
tomobile searches, it repeals the fourth amendment warrant requirement itself."
102 S. Ct. at 2173. Justice White also agreed with "much" of Justice Marshall's dis-
sent. Id.
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esies; it equated the policeman's determination of probable cause
with that of the magistrate; and it intimated that the scope of a
warrantless search is as broad as could be authorized by a
magistrate.'"
The fourth amendment makes no mention of magistrates; it
merely requires that warrants be issued upon a showing of prob-
able cause supported by the oath or affirmation of the police of-
ficer requesting the warrant. 4 5 The role of determining probable
cause has worked its way to the judicial branch of government be-
cause it is best able to check potential abuses by the executive
branch. 46 Warrants would cease to provide any protection
against unreasonable governmental intrusions if their issuance
were committed to the branch which carries them into effect. Jus-
tice Marshall believes the warrant requirement stands on its own;
it is not merely an archaic institution of American jurisprudence.
It provides for a sense and appearance of order and fair play con-
trary to popular notions.147 The first heresy allegedly committed
by the majority in Ross would be inconsistent with these
considerations.
As far as the second heresy goes, Justice Marshall admitted
only that Detective Cassidy could have searched Ross' paper bag
and pouch if he had a warrant.148 The scope of a search carried
out with a warrant necessarily includes containers and packages.
But the scope of a warrantless search cannot be that broad.149
144. Note that the first contention is not admitted by the majority; the second,
however, is the majority's mainstay. The author, as well as Justice Marshall, opine
that the first is implicit in the second.
145. See supra note 11.
146. See United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 317 (1972),
in which the Court noted that the important function served by the magistrate is
that he is neutral and detached from the enforcement of law. Requiring a search
warrant checks potential abuses by the executive branch of government, and en-
sures that unjustified searches do not occur. See generally 102 S. Ct. at 2174-75.
147. Justice Marshall quotes a portion of Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10,
13-14 (1948), which has been widely relied on:
The point of the fourth amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous
officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual in-
ferences' which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection con-
sists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and
detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the
often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.
102 S. Ct. at 2175.
148. 102 S. Ct. at 2175. That is not admitting very much. Yet he also conceded
the finding of probable cause.
149. Id; see supra notes 133 and 144. Since Justice Marshall rejects the major-
Justice Marshall said the warrant requirement is excused in some
instances only because the circumstances surrounding the partic-
ular search would make it ludicrous, dangerous, or offensive to in-
dividual liberty to require a warrant. But each warrantless search
must be examined carefully to see that it truly was justified by
the "exigent" circumstances. 150
The warrantless search of a car is excused only because the car
is mobile, and the owner's expectation of privacy in its contents is
diminished.151 Justice Marshall argued that these two narrow
grounds cannot be used to justify the warrantless search of con-
tainers found inside the car. 52 Since the warrantless search of a
container in an automobile is not justified on the same grounds as
the search of the car itself, the search must be illegal. Thus, even
though a magistrate could authorize the search of containers
found in a car, the warrantless search of such containers is
impermissible.
Justice Marshall posited that, in reality, a car is no more mobile
than a container once its owner is placed in police custody. But
since police may not have cause in every case to detain the driver
of the car, their only alternative would be to let the driver go. Po-
lice could conceivably detain the car's driver until a search war-
rant for the car could be obtained. In that case, however, the act
of obtaining the warrant would be more intrusive than the imme-
diate search. 153
Countered with that is the idea that the owner's expectation of
privacy in his car is diminished. Justice Marshall cited Arkansas
v. Sanders as authority that the warrantless search of a car is not
as intrusive as the warrantless search of other areas. 54 Police are
therefore allowed to carry out the "lesser" intrusion of a car
ity's position that the policeman's determination of probable cause is the same as
the magistrate's, the policeman's authority to carry out a warrantless search could
never be as broad as that which could be authorized by a magistrate. That being
so, the scope of a warrantless search could never be as broad as a search con-
ducted pursuant to a warrant.
150. 102 S. Ct. at 2176; see supra notes 101-05.
151. 102 S. Ct. at 2175. If these two circumstances do not exist, according to Jus-
tice Marshall, a warrantless search may not be justified by the rule in Carroll.
152. What follows is Justice Marshall's argument that the warrantless search of
containers may not be upheld on the two grounds mentioned as excusing a war-
rantless automobile search. Justice Marshall also makes the institutional argu-
ment that the narrow grounds justifying a warrantless automobile search may
never be used to justify the search of a different place or thing. Id.
153. But see 399 U.S. at 51; (see also supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text).
Justice White, writing for the majority, rejected the so-called "lesser/greater intru-
sion" dichotomy. The Court did not believe it possible to determine with any de-
gree of consistency which intrusion, in any given situation, offended the fourth
amendment most. Contra 102 S. Ct. at 2176.
154. 102 S. Ct. at 2175-76; see 442 U.S. at 762, 764-65.
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search rather than hold the driver and risk violating the fourth
amendment, or simply let him go.155
Justice Marshall argued, however, that the same does not hold
true for containers found in the car. A container or package can
be seized and detained by police until they can obtain a warrant
without holding the package's owner and raising the fourth
amendment concerns expressed above. Since mobility is not a
problem, there is no significant intrusion which, to be avoided,
would necessitate a warrantless search. Also, the policy argu-
ments which dictate a diminished expectation of privacy in an au-
tomobile do not apply to packages or containers.1 5 6 The
automobile exception to the warrant requirement, therefore, can-
not be used to justify the warrantless search of a package. The
scope of a warrantless search of an automobile, limited by the
practical necessities creating the exception, does not include the
permission to search closed containers; its scope is therefore not
as broad as a magistrate's warrant. If police intend to justify the
warrantless search of containers found in automobiles, they must
do so with other exigent circumstances.
At this point in his opinion, Justice Marshall expressed his fear
that the majority may have fashioned a new exception to the war-
rant requirement instead of broadening, albeit illegitimately, the
automobile exception.15 7 He warned of a "probable cause" excep-
tion to the warrant requirement, 5 8 which is not really an excep-
tion but a rule in and of itself. Justice Marshall claimed a similar
argument was rejected in Coolidge v. New Hampshire. 15 9 Justice
Marshall then went on to reinforce his support for Arkansas v.
155. Contra 102 S. Ct. at 1263 n.9; Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975).
156. 102 S. Ct. at 2175.76. The driver of an automobile exposes much of what he
carries to the plain view of law enforcement officials. The government has also
seen fit to regulate the use of automobiles. Neither of these facts apply to contain-
ers. Justice Marshall said the government has no interest in regulating the use of
packages, and the package's owner does not exhibit the package's contents to
plain view, but precisely because he covers them, intends for them to be kept
private.
157. Id. This follows from Justice Marshall's institutional argument that the
Carroll decision justifies the warrantless searches of automobiles, and nothing
else. Since the Carroll exception will not apply to containers, their warrantless
search must be justified by other exigent circumstances, and another exception to
the warrant requirement. See supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
158. Apparently such an exception authorizes warrantless searches whenever
police have probable cause to believe contraband is hidden in the object of their
search.
159. 102. S. Ct. at 2176; see Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
Sanders and Robbins v. California. 160
After dealing with the fourth amendment in the abstract, Jus-
tice Marshall criticized the majority's reliance on Carroll v. United
States and Chambers v. Maroney in the particular. The Court in
Carroll did not excuse all warrantless searches of automobiles. 161
If securing a warrant were reasonably practicable, "it must be
used."'162 Justice Marshall noted that secondary containers were
not involved in Carroll or Chambers. The "integral compart-
ments" of automobiles spoken of in Chambers were not the same
things as containers for fourth amendment purposes. Such com-
partments are integral because they are part of the car. They
could not be seized apart from the car; they therefore escape the
Sanders rationale. But containers are different; they are not part
of the car and can be seized until a warrant is obtained.163
Justice Marshall then disposed of Justice Stevens' "logical and
absurd" argument and his "practical considerations" argument.164
First, it is not illogical or absurd to require a warrant before
searching a container even when one is not required to search an
integral compartment. As noted above, Justice Marshall stressed
the separateness of the package from the automobile and the po-
liceman's ability to seize it without significant fourth amendment
intrusion.165 Second, the real practical advantage obtained in Car-
roll was not having to immobilize the vehicle until a warrant
could be obtained.166 Since cars and containers are different, the
practical advantage would not be nullified by requiring a warrant
before a search of a package.
Justice Marshall then proceeded with his most interesting criti-
cism. It had to do with the majority's attempt to distinguish
160. Justice Marshall drew upon the rationale of those cases that movable con-
tainers are distinct from the vehicles they ride in. They should not, therefore, be
searched without a warrant on the basis of the automobile exception. See supra
note 157. Other exceptions, depending on the circumstances, would presumably
provide sufficient flexibility where a mere seizure of the container would be unrea-
sonably burdensome to law enforcement efforts. Yet the government in Ross did
not try to point to any such exigencies, so in Justice Marshall's opinion, the search
was illegal.
161. Justice Marshall posited in a footnote that the agents in Carroll could not
have arrested the bootleggers because such activity was only a misdemeanor.
Thus, their only alternative was to leave the bootleggers stranded while they
impounded the car to obtain a warrant. Under those circumstances, the obtaining
of a warrant would be impracticable. See 102 S. Ct. at 2178 n.6 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
162. 267 U.S. 132 at 156 (1924); see supra note 45 and accompanying text.
163. 102 S. Ct. at 2179; see supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 154-56.
166. 102 S. Ct. at 2179; contra id. at 2170.
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Chadwick and Sanders from Ross. 167 The majority expressed
support for the holding in each case:168 the warrantless search of
a container cannot be justified simply because it is in a car. In
each case, police inquiry had focused on a particular package. Po-
lice in each case could have seized the package, having probable
cause, and held it until a warrant was obtained. Justice Stevens
maintained that this still holds true.169 Where police have fo-
cused their search on a particular container, they must seize it
and obtain a warrant before opening it. Justice Marshall asked
why there was any more compelling reason to seize that package
than one which the police did not know was in the car. Justice
Marshall complained of the rule's peculiar and unworkable conse-
quences. 170 Also, the lack of connection between the automobile
and container in both of those cases may not be as important as
the majority had thought.'7 ' Police may have had a legitimate
reason for waiting until the cars drove off. The Court in both
Sanders and Chadwick did not address this point.
Justice Marshall concluded his dissenting opinion with what
167. As was stated earlier, the majority decided against treating Ross as a
container case in order to avoid overruling Sanders and Chadwick. Yet the facts
of Ross were so close that some distinction had to be made. See supra note 121
and accompanying text.
168. 102 S. Ct. at 2172.
169. Id. Justice Stevens explained that the scope of the Ross search is defined
not by the "nature of the container," but by the "object of the search and the
places in which there is probable cause to believe that it may be found." Thus,
mere probable cause to believe that a "container placed in the trunk of a taxi con-
tains contraband...does not justify a search of the entire cab." Id.
But is that not what will happen anyway? See infra notes 178-80.
170. "[Tlhe government 'must show that the investigating officer knew enough
but not too much, that he had sufficient knowledge to establish probable cause but
insufficient knowledge to know exactly where the contraband was located.'" 102
S. Ct. at 2180 (quoting United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d 1159, 1202 (Wilkey, J.,
dissenting)).
171. Justice Marshall set forth that the police in Chadwick and Sanders may
have had legitimate reasons for waiting until the contraband was placed in both of
the cars before arresting the defendants. If that were so, then the relationship be-
tween the automobiles and the contraband would not be so "coincidental," and
part of Justice Stevens' argument would fail. 102 S. Ct. at 2180. Justice Stevens
distinguished Sanders and Chadwick from Ross on the basis that the nexus be-
tween the contraband and the automobile in Chadwick and Sanders was so atten-
uated as to be negligible. 102 S. Ct. at 2165-67; see also 442 U.S. at 766-68 (Burger,
C.J., concurring). That being so, the scope of the automobile exception was not at
issue as it would be in cases like Ross and Robbins where the nexus was consider-
able, the police having probable cause to search the car, and not some container
housed within. 102 S. Ct. at 2168 (quoting Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. at 435
(Powell, J., concurring)).
has become his favorite theme.172 He claimed he could see only
one "convincing explanation" for the majority's opinion: expedi-
ency.173 But that is not reason enough for broadening police au-
thority to search; after all, "is not a dictatorship the most efficient
form of government?"' 74
In short, Justice Marshall does a marvelous job of contradicting
the majority at every conceivable point. He recognized the grav-
ity of the majority's position on the warrant requirement and pro-
vided rational criticism for it. Justice Marshall did a great service
for those who read dissents first in order to get a clear picture of
the controversy. It is the author's view that Justice Marshall goes
right to the heart of the majority's opinion when he said its only
justification was institutional expediency. Since it is easier for
police to conduct their business without a warrant, it is better to
do away with it. But Justice Marshall does not adequately ex-
plain why institutional expediency is not a proper objective, or
why the warrant requirement serves any rational purpose.
V. IMPACT
As might be expected, the impact of United States v. Ross is ex-
tensive. It had its most apparent impact on two previous
Supreme Court opinions.
The Court in Ross overruled Robbins v. California. 175 The
Court makes much of the fact that there was not a majority opin-
ion in Robbins, so that stare decisis did not preclude ignoring it.
But too much cannot be made of the fact that Ross overruled a
case barely one year old. Admittedly, the step taken in Robbins
was not a sure one. And perhaps it was better to have disposed of
Robbins in one brush of the pen instead of picking it to death,
which has been the current, much criticized practice of the Court.
Yet such treatment cannot help but make the public wonder
about the value of precedent to the Court today.
Some of the language in Arkansas v. Sanders was eliminated.176
The Court adhered to the holding of Sanders, however. 77 The
Court disposed of the general language which went beyond the
172. Both Justices Marshall and Brennan argue that expediency and efficiency
in law enforcement are insufficient reasons for restricting fourth amendment
rights. See, e.g., 453 U.S. at 469.
173. 102 S. Ct. at 2181.
174. Id. at 2181 n.13. Justice Marshall quoted from the Court's opinion in
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978).
175. 102 S. Ct. at 2177. However, the Court never admits it in so many words.
176. Id. The Court in Ross precisely overruled the language in Sanders relied
upon by the Court in Robbins. See 442 U.S. at 762-66.
177. 102 S. Ct. at 2172.
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scope of the Sanders facts. That was the language that led the
Robbins plurality to believe a warrantless search of an automo-
bile could never be extended to closed containers found inside.
The Court in Ross did not directly implicate United States v.
Chadwick. However, the rules in both Sanders and Chadwick
were questioned by Ross. ' 7 8 The Court was obviously not very
enamored with the rule expressed in both cases: requiring police
officers to seize packages and hold them in order to obtain a war-
rant before searching them. The Court did pay lip service to that
rule, at least in cases where the object of the automobile search is
a specifically recognizable piece of luggage or package.' 79 But cer-
tainly, as Justice Marshall pointed out in dissent, it would be no
harder for police to seize all packages instead of only those which
they recognized before the automobile search. The Court's si-
lence on this matter hints at its displeasure with the Chad-
wick/Sanders rule. Rare will be the instance when the Court will
strike down a search under Chadwick and Sanders. Ross did just
what the majority apparently wanted: it took a big bite out of the
Sanders rule without overruling the case. 8 0
More importantly, it is clear the the Ross majority did in theory,
178. The rules in Chadwick and Sanders reflect the Court's attempt to fashion
a distinct fourth amendment rule for containers. That rule's inevitable contact
with the automobile proved to be its downfall. The confusion that resulted from
the two cases (noted by Justice Blackmun in his dissenting opinion in Robbins,
453 U.S. 420, 426, 436 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)) is mute testimony to their un-
workability. Also, both decisions reflect a preferential attitude of the Court at that
time, to the warrant requirement. After the lessons in Robinson, Belton, and Ross,
it is doubtful that warrants will be preferred again.
179. 102 S. Ct. at 2172; see supra note 169.
180. It is doubtful that any court will strike down a warrantless search on the
basis of Chadwick or Sanders. In light of Ross, police officers would virtually have
to admit that they knew the contraband was in a specific package or piece of lug-
gage before they searched the automobile and that specifically recognized
container, before a warrantless search would be found illegal, Justice Stevens'
conciliatory example to the contrary notwithstanding. 102 S. Ct. at 2172.
In the example, Justice Stevens explains that probable cause to believe that un-
documented aliens are being transported in a van will not justify a warrantless
search of a suitcase found in the van. But not only is the example facile, it is anti-
thetical to the holding of the case. The reasoning is obvious: the object of the po-
lice search is undocumented aliens; it is illogical to suppose that any of them
could be found hiding in a suitcase. So, a warrant must be obtained before search-
ing it. But an officer, under Ross, will be searching and seizing containers in
which contraband or weapons may be found. As experience has shown, there is
no limit to the imagination or creativity of a serious smuggler in finding places to
hide the loot. Since that is the case, there is really no limit, consistent with Ross,
to which police cannot go to find the contraband they have probable cause to be-
if not in fact, embrace Justice Marshall's fear that the policeman's
determination of probable cause would be equated with the mag-
istrate's by the Court. This proposition follows logically from
what the Court specifically addressed in Ross: that the scope of a
warrantless search is as broad as that authorized by a magistrate.
As both the majority and dissent agreed, a magistrate could au-
thorize the search of containters found in an automobile. Yet
even a magistrate's authority to permit a search is limited by his
determination of probable cause. Justice Stevens admitted that
the only limit on the officer's authority to conduct a warrantless
search is the same probable cause.181 Neither power, then, is ab-
solute. The policeman's authority to search is no "broader" than
the magistrate's. But being admittedly no "narrower," the police-
man's authority must be identical. The policeman may go no fur-
ther than the magistrate could go; that necessarily equates their
determinations of probable cause. The majority's attempt to steer
away from this was question-begging. 182
This leads to the most important point of all. If the officer's de-
termination of probable cause is not different than the magis-
trate's, why continue' the senseless charade of warrantless
searches being "per se unreasonable?" A warrantless search of
an automobile is no greater intrusion than a search conducted
with a warrant since the policeman and magistrate's roles are in-
terchangeable. The Court, for obvious reasons, chose not to ad-
dress this volatile issue openly; but it is implicit in the decision.
The Court may legitimately fear treading this ground alone. Even
so, it should air the issue so that the public knows it is there.
As a final note, there is the interesting question raised earlier of
whether United States v. Ross is a bright-line rule. 8 3 It certainly
passes the first test: it is clear and understandable for police of-
ficers on the beat. Yet Justice Stevens tried to disavow the
bright-line infamy by stating that Ross merely expanded, or de-
lieve is being transported in an automobile. Otherwise, the Court has returned to
Chadwick and Sanders and the confusion they engendered.
At any rate, the undocumented alien example is dictum. Justice Stevens' inten-
tion probably was to avoid tampering with the holding of Sanders at all costs and,
to do so, he had to bend over backwards in order to ease Ross' transition. The
holding of Ross, therefore, appears to be as broad as stated earlier. Otherwise, it
would not have accomplished its important objective of providing clear direction
to law enforcement officials. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
181. 102 S. Ct. at 2171-72.
182. See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
183. See supra note 119. If Ross is a bright-line rule, then all of the discussion
about whether there is any limit on the scope of the Ross search besides probable
cause would be academic: probable cause would be the only reviewable limit of an
automobile search.
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fined a pre-existing exception to the warrant requirement.184 The
next question is whether Ross foreclosed judicial scrutiny of the
circumstances allegedly justifying the warrantless search, as all
good bright-line rules do. Here, Justice Stevens cut with a sharp
knife. A court may properly inquire as to whether a specific pack-
age was on the minds of the police officers when they conducted
their warrantless search of the automobile. If so, the search is il-
legal by Arkansas v. Sanders. Such a proof is almost a practical
impossibility, however. No officer is now going to admit that he
knew exactly what he was looking for when he stopped the car.
In theory, judicial review is not foreclosed, but in practice, it is
doubtful that any court would invalidate the warrantless search of
a container found in an automobile. Justice Stevens cited no
bright-line rule cases in an attempt to put distance between his
opinion and the criticized bright-line rule. Apparently, the letter
of the bright-line rules is not favored by the Court. It will be left
to an application of Ross to see whether their spirit is still alive.
VI. CONCLUSION
The evil of United States v. Ross, if there is any, lies in the
Court's refusal to address the important issue of whether the war-
rant requirement of the fourth amendment retains any modern
significance. There has been research in the last decade or so
which suggests that it does not.185 A constitution must change
with the times; slowly perhaps, but it must keep step with its peo-
ple. Tradition, for tradition's sake, is a poor excuse for retaining
184. 102 S. Ct. at 2172. Justice Stevens made a point of affirming the "basic rule
of fourth amendment jurisprudence" stated in Katz: warrantless searches are per
se unreasonable; exceptions to the warrant requirement are few, specifically es-
tablished and well-delineated. He also referred to automobile searches conducted
under Carroll as "not unreasonable," id. at 2159, negating the inference that they
were "reasonable," or rules in and of themselves. See supra note 103 and accom-
panying text. By this, it appears that Ross merely expanded the scope of the auto-
mobile exception. Since it operates, theoretically at least, within the exception
aegis instead of without, it appears to follow the traditional analysis of fourth
amendment jurisprudence. Added to this, Justice Stevens cited neither Robinson
nor (surprisingly) Belton, evidencing his intent to put distance between Ross and
the bright-line rules.
185. See W. LAFAVE, ARREST-THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY,
pp. 34-46 (1965). Professor LaFave explained how the issuance of a search warrant
has become a perfunctory exercise of court administration. He related one in-
stance in which a judge was met in the court hallway by a police officer who, while
exchanging greetings, handed him a folded warrant form, which the judge signed
without reading and then continued on his way.
an institution which flies in the face of public necessity. It may
very well be true that search warrants are an intolerable burden
on law enforcement and, at the same time, provide no protection
for the public from unreasonable searches and seizures. If so,
there is no heresy in striking the warrant requirement down.
Such a move would be grave; it would strike at one of the roots of
Anglo-American jurisprudence. Yet good or bad, it is a decision
for all of us to at least consider.
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